The DIMACS Workshop on Distributed Computing and Cryptography was held at the Nassau Inn in Princeton, New Jersey, on October 4, 5, and 6, 1989. Participants took a critical look at the results, choice of problems, guiding philosophies, research methodology, and engineering projects that currently absorb much of the e ort of people working in \cryptography" and \computer system security." This report summarizes both the formal presentations and the informal discussions that took place.
The part of the theoretical computer science community that studies cryptography has created a large amount of terminology. Many of these terms were used in Wednesday morning's talks. The lexicon includes: authentication, bit commitment, blobs, claw-free one-way permutations, coherence, cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generation, digital signature scheme, distributed function evaluation, envelopes, instance-hiding scheme, locally random reducibility, noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system, oblivious transfer, obliviously cryptographic multiparty unconditionally secure protocols, one-way authentication, oneway function, one-way hash function, one-way permutation, probabilistic encryption, publickey cryptosystem, random-self-reducibility, secret sharing, secret-key exchange, secure circuit evaluation, trapdoor function, zero-knowledge proof system, etc., etc. Many speci c questions were raised at the workshop about various terms on this list, and some of them appear both in this section and in the next one. Here, we would also like to raise a general issue { for a lengthier discussion, see the article by Merritt in these proceedings.
We have seen an outpouring of papers proving the equivalence (via polynomial-time reduction), the inequivalence (via standard techniques such as diagonalization or counting arguments) or the probable inequivalence (in various technical senses) of some pairs of these terms. On example of such a result is Naor's theorem that one-way functions su ce for bit commitment 89] . Within computer science, it is the structural complexity theory community that is traditionally concerned with abstract classes of objects, polynomial-time reductions among members of a single class, and equality or inequality of classes. Theirs are usually language classes and function classes de ned by time-and space-bounds, whereas the classes studied by cryptographers are de ned by the terms listed above.
Question 1 Is cryptography theory a branch of structural complexity theory? If not, then
what is the end goal of this sizable e ort to prove the equivalence or inequivalence of all of the terms we have de ned?
One aspect of Question 1 is \what is the goal of crypto-theory and is it satisfying as a pure theory?" There are traditional criteria by which to judge a pure theory; examples include depth, elegance, and technical di culty.
Another aspect of this issue is summarized in the next question, which was raised explicitly during the discussion on Wednesday and sparked a long, animated discussion.
Question 2 Which of the ideas studied by the cryptography-theory community are (or should be) valued by practitioners?
Practitioners o ered three speci c answers almost immediately: public-key systems, hard-to-invert hash functions, and digital signatures. This was very heartening for some of us. Are there other examples of practically useful contributions of the theory?
Many of the talks abstracted in Section 2.1 concern what we will call secure distributed function evaluation. The question addressed in this work is whether players P 1 , : : :, P n , each with a private input x 1 , : : :, x n , can together compute a function y = f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) in such a way that each player learns y and no player P i learns anything about x j except what is implied by y. There have been a number of papers on this subject in recent years. In many of these papers, the model of computation and communication is a complete, synchronous network of arbitrarily powerful processors in which each pair of processors has a private channel over which to communicate. (This is often referred to as \the noncryptographic model.") The questions addressed include the number of malicious participants that can be thwarted, the number of rounds of communication needed, the lengths of the messages sent, and the local processing cost.
Feigenbaum posed the following question explicitly.
Question 3 Is secure distributed function evaluation ever done in practice? If not, is it
because the model of computation and communication is unrealistic, or is it because there is no real motivation for doing it?
There was a lengthy discussion following this question. Its length was probably due in large part to Lampson's initial answer: \I am glad that you asked that question, because it has always been a complete mystery to me why anyone would ever want to do such a thing."
The prototype pedagogical example of a situation in which one would use secure distributed function evaluation is voting: Everyone nds out who won but no one nds out who voted for whom. No one at the workshop mentioned an actual implementation of such a voting protocol. We would like to know whether anyone actually uses secure distributed function evaluation to do voting.
Yung suggested the following answer to Question 3. The Feige-Fiat-Shamir identi cation scheme 51] requires the generation of a modulus of the form n = pq, where both p and q are primes, that will be used by all of the participants. The participants can use a secure distributed function evaluation protocol to generate n; each participant will know n, none will know p and q, and there will be no need for a trusted server that does key-generation, as there is in most identi cation schemes. Is this a realistic suggestion?
The discussion about whether or not massive amounts of theoretical work on secure, distributed function evaluation is justi ed by the practical importance of the problem ended without any general conclusions. However, the practitioners' response to Question 2 convinced us that the theory of cryptography has had something to contribute to computing practice.
We have mentioned the noncryptographic model of secure distributed function evaluation. Not surprisingly, there is also a \cryptographic model" of secure distributed function evaluation (see, for example, the talk of Rogaway, abstracted in Section 2.1). More surprisingly, there are also other models (e.g. , 72] ). This proliferation of models and formalism is making it impossible (even for the people speaking and listening in the Wednesday morning session, many of whom have worked on these problems) to read papers in the eld. More than one participant made the following suggestion.
Question 4 Consolidate the existing work on secure distributed function evaluation. Narrow down to as few models as are needed to prove the essential results. Make clear the relationships (if any) among results in di erent models. Make clear the relationship between theoretical work on this problem and actual distributed computations.
In some sense, secure distributed function evaluation is a generalization of oblivious transfer (OT), which was introduced by M. Rabin 97] in 1981 and has also been the subject of a number of theoretical papers (and of some talks at this workshop).
Question 5 Is OT ever used in practice?
On Wednesday afternoon, Lampson, Reeds, and Tsudik all talked about designs of networks, both local-area and wide-area, that provide mechanisms for secure computation and communication. Bishop spoke about plans to add a mechanism for secure communication to the internet. All of the networks or designs discussed include some concept of \physically secure" or \trusted" components. Tygar asked whether the role of such components can be formalized in a general way: Question 6 What exactly is \secure hardware" and how much of it is needed? What tradeo s are involved?
Results on some aspects of this question have been proven. See, for example, Yung's paper in these proceedings for results on the question of whether \secure communication channels" are necessary in certain situations.
Thursday, October 5, 1989
The talks of Burrows and Abadi provoked a lot of discussion. Merritt observed that this logical approach reveals weaknesses in protocols via an inability to derive a proof of authentication. He noted that such independence arguments are often technically di cult; moreover, they do not in themselves provide a construction of a successful attack on the insecure protocol.
Merritt also noted that if a protocol were modi ed so that all participants initially broadcast their secret keys, a proofs of correctness would still go through. The apparant paradox is resolved by noting that the axioms of the logic no longer apply to the modi ed protocol. The speakers noted that the logic does not check for unauthorized release of secrets.
Most of the ensuing discussion concerned the general question of whether formal systems, and in particular those based on logic, that claim to \analyze protocols" and \prove them correct (resp. secure)" are really convincing. The following sociological observation was made repeatedly: When a formal system nds a bug in a protocol, everyone believes that it is a bug; when a formal system nds a \proof of correctness (resp. security)," people seem to have trouble believing that it's a proof.
Every logical system consists of a set of rules of inference and a set of axioms. To apply the conclusions of the logic to an actual computer system, the axioms have to be interpreted within that domain. Inevitably, simplifying assumptions are made that may invalidate the conclusions.
Question 7 Why should cryptographers have con dence in any particular set of axioms or inference rules?
More speci cally, Question 8 Logical systems allow us to prove that one set of symbols implies some other set of symbols, according to some well-de ned notion of \implies." How do we convince ourselves that these symbols or this \proof" bears any meaningful relationship to the bits oating around in our network? If it still requires \magic" on the part of a human being to describe these bits in terms of \axioms," then what is advantage of automating the inference stage of the proof? >From a purely logical perspective, this is a question of the semantics of the logic. Logics express properties of families of formal systems, the models or interpretations of the logic. Burrows, Abadi, and Needham have devised a simple semantics for their logic of authentication 31] that su ces to establish the consistency of the logic, but it has a simple syntactic character with no apparant relation to authentication protocols.
Question 9 Does the Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic of authentication have a semantics more apparently related to authentication protocols?
Two speci c avenues of investigation were suggested: Tuttle suggested that an explicit complexity-theoretic semantics similar to those in 67] might be possible. Racko also made the point that complexity theory is the appropriate mechanism for bridging logic and practice. Merritt suggested a simpler \ping-pong" semantics along the lines of 47, 48, 49, 41, 86] . Such a semantics models the cryptosystem as a black-box, with perfect information-hiding properties.
Lamport noted that a hierarchical theory can, in principle, bridge the gap between physical systems and high-level formalisms. Presumably, one starts from such a low-level formal model that the relationship to the physical world is clear. Next, one constructs a hierarchy of formal systems at increasing levels of complexity and heights of absraction, and constructs proofs by relating properties of systems at adjacent levels. (See, for example, 77, 33, 83] .) Observing that cryptosystems are designed to ba e a very similar analysis, we pose the following:
Question 10 Can these hierarchical proof techniques be applied to cryptographic systems?
Lipton later presented a list of axioms for intuitionist logic and noted the di culty of appreciating the theory from its axioms alone. He argued that the semantics are crucial in considering the \correctness" a theory. (This was echoed later in Weinberger's presentation, in which Weinberger noted that people may na vely accept an axiom that \trust" is transitive, but object to conclusions drawn from that axiom.) Some of the issues raised during this discussion at the workshop are considered in Burrows's, Abadi's, and Needham's article in these proceedings.
One of the protocols discussed in Abadi's talk assumed an encryption function with the following property: Given the ciphertext E(x), it is infeasible to generate the ciphertext E(x + 1). Of course, x + 1 could be replaced with any simple function of x. The existence of such an encryption function is an open question. The RSA encryption function E : -6 -homomorphism, and so it is easy to generate E(x + y) given E(x) and E(y). For both functions, it is assumed to be di cult to generate the other combination of ciphertexts.
An encryption function with the property that it is easy to compute both E(x + y) and E(xy) from E(x) and E(y) could not be used in the protocol discussed by Abadi. However, it could be used to accomplish noninteractive, two-player secure circuit evaluation in the cryptographic model (cf. 1, 26] ).
In summary, we have the following related questions.
Question 11 (a) Is there an encryption function E() such that both E(x + y) and E(xy) are easy to compute from E(x) and E(y)?
(b) Is there any other way to accomplish noninteractive, two-player secure circuit evaluation in the cryptographic model?
(c) Alternatively, prove a nontrivial lower bound on the round complexity of two-player secure circuit evaluation in this model.
Tygar's talk focussed on issues of notation and formal manipulation of security policies. Echoing previous discussion, questions were raised as to the semantics of such notation. Tygar commented that typically each permission allows the holder to execute a speci c system call, which provides its de facto semantics. Discussion centered on the di culty of deciding security properties such as secrecy using this approach, particularly as speci cs of system calls vary between operating systems. Again, the theme was the distance between formalism and reality.
Question 12
(a) Can access matrices be augmented usefully by precise interpretation for speci c permissions?
(b) Could a small, orthogonal set of such permissions support a rich operating environment and still allow the simple derivation of meaningful security-related conclusions?
(c) Consider (a) and (b) speci cally in the context of a networked computing environment.
A later talk by Weinberger explored the problems of engineering security in real network environments, reinforcing both the importance and di culty of resolving these questions. Noting the inadequacies of simple client-server models, he posed the following question.
Question 13 Can the abstraction and theory of transactions be applied to security problems, particularly in networks?
The talks of Odlyzko and A. Lenstra about recent practical experience with discrete-log and factoring algorithms provoked two sorts of questions. One sort were straightforward questions to the speakers about what length keys they recommend for current use of Di eHellman key-exchange and RSA, respectively. Odlyzko recommended moduli of length at least 300 decimal digits for use in the Di e-Hellman scheme; this estimate takes into account the current work on the number-eld sieve method 78]. A. Lenstra would not be pinned down on a key-length for RSA.
Odlyzko's talk also spurred a sociological discussion. The discrete-log algorithm that he and LaMacchia used to break the commercial system had been published in a mainstream journal more than 3 years before they conducted their experiment 37]. The published paper contained enough detail to suggest that primes of the size used in this commercial system were too small. Question 14 Are the vendors of commercial systems that rely on the di culty of the discrete-log problem aware of the literature on discrete-log algorithms? If not, is there something that the research community can do about this?
1.1.3 Friday, October 6, 1989 The talks by Blum, Kannan, Rubinfeld, and Lipton led to a lot of discussion about their de nitions of program-checking and program-testing. Much of the discussion focussed on the \little-oh" condition imposed on some checkers in 21]. 1 The little-oh condition is designed to ensure that the checker will be di erent from the program being checked (i.e., that it will not just run the same code twice and compare the answers) and, more controversially, that it will be \simpler to debug" than the program being checked. If the checker is not simpler to debug, then one has not gained anything, since the checker is itself a program.
Question 15
(a) Why should one believe that programs with lower asymptotic running-times are simpler to debug than programs with higher asymptotic running-times? In fact, it seems that there is evidence that the opposite is the case: Algorithms that use sophisticated techniques to compute things fast are often the hardest to code up correctly.
(b) Is there a better formal de nition of \simpler to debug" that can be used to enhance the theory of checking?
Goldwasser presented a signature scheme implemented from one-way permutations 60]. She posed the following problem.
Question 16 Can the assumption of one-way permutation be weakened to one-way function
These signatures have the property that each is independent of previous signatures. In previous solutions, the signature of each message essentially contains all previous signatures 62, 16, 90] . Goldwasser criticized these schemes as resulting in huge signatures and used the independence property to motivate her solution as more e cient. Merritt objected that only polynomially many messages can be signed in any such cryptographic scheme, so that the size of the \huge" messages is still polynomial in the security parameter. Indeed, if early signatures are padded to the length of the last signature, then the length of all signatures is the same, and still polynomial in the security parameter. Goldwasser accepted the point, and described the independence property as an issue of aesthetics, not e ciency.
Question 17 Which \provably secure" signature scheme is most e cient? Question 18 If two implementations of the same cryptographic primitive are constructed from di erent asymptotic complexity assumptions, can their e ciency be compared meaningfully?
Complexity Theory
Throughout this section, we use AM(r) to denote the class of languages recognizable by rround Arthur-Merlin games (cf. 6]) and IP(r) to denote the class of languages recognizable by r-round interactive proof systems with polynomial-time Turing Machine veri ers (cf. 61]). AM(poly) (resp. IP(poly), also known simply as IP) denotes the union, over all polynomials r, of AM(r) (resp. IP(r)). We use p i and p i to denote the levels of the polynomial hierarchy and PH to denote the entire hierarchy. If C is a complexity class of languages, we use fC to denote the corresponding class of total functions. For example, fNP is the class of total functions computable in nondeterministic polynomial time.
The following relationships are known (cf. The answer to Question 20 would be \yes" if there were an interactive proof system for coSAT in which the prover's computational power was limited to NP coNP. The best known upper bound on the power needed by the prover in an interactive proof system for coSAT is #P (cf. 81]). By Toda's theorem 108], such a prover is powerful enough to recognize all of PH, which is (presumably) quite a bit more than NP coNP. This suggests the following question, which is less ambitious than the previous one.
Question 21 Is there an interactive proof system for coSAT in which the prover is less powerful than #P?
The notion of random-self-reducibility plays a role in many of the results presented at this workshop. The random-self-reducible sets are far from fully characterized. For convenience, we repeat the following de nition from 52]. It is a generalization of the original de nition given in 2]. 2 De nition 1 Let jxj = n and r be an element of f0;1g m , where m is bounded by a polynomial in n. A set S is k-random-self-reducible (abbreviated k-rsr) if there are polynomial-time computable functions , 1 , : : :, k such that (1) for all n, all x 2 f0;1g n , and all r 2 f0;1g m , S (x) = (x; r; S ( 1 (x; r)); : : :; S ( k (x; r))); and 2 Abadi, Feigenbaum, and Kilian (STOC, 1987) gave the rst formal de nition of random-self-reducible sets; their de nition corresponds to what are now called 1-rsr sets, in the language of 52]. Subsequently, Tompa and Woll 109] considered random-self-reducible relations; they showed that relations f(x; y)g for which there are random-self-reductions, e cient probabilistic algorithms that produce uniformly distributed pairs (x; y), and e cient probabilistic algorithms that test whether a pair (x; y) is in the relation give rise to \perfect zero-knowledge proofs of possession of information." Note that any relation R that satis es all of these properties corresponds to a set S = fx : 9y such that (x; y) 2 Rg that is in NP. Thus these sets are a proper subclass of the 1-rsr sets, some of which are not even r.e.; see 2] for more details. The key point is that random-self-reducibility is a way of upper-bounding the worst-case complexity of a set in terms of its average-case complexity; since the average-case complexity may be arbitrarily high, random-self-reducibility certainly does not give an absolute upper bound on the complexity of the set.
(2) if r is chosen uniformly at random from f0;1g m , then each i (x; r) is uniformly distributed over f0;1g n .
Note that, in general, k is a function of n, and the i 's are dependent, although individually each is uniform. S denotes the characteristic function of S.
We denote by poly-RSR 3 the class of sets that are k-rsr for some polynomial k. Several negative results about poly-RSR are given in 52]. In particular, it is shown that any set that is 2-rsr is in NP=poly \ coNP=poly. Thus, if SAT is 2-rsr, the PH collapses at the third level (see 52] for details).
Question 22 Is SAT k-rsr for any constant k? More generally, is SAT in poly-RSR? Question 23 Clearly every set that is k(n)-rsr is (k(n) + 1)-rsr. Is this hierarchy strict?
Note, in Question 23, that 1-rsr functions are probably a proper subset of poly-RSR: By the results in 10, 80] , the permanent function is in poly-RSR; however, by the main result in 2], the permanent function is not 1-rsr, unless the PH collapses.
The de nition of coherent sets (cf. Yao 111] ) was motivated by, among other things, the de nitions in 2, 21, 52]. The following relationships among coherence, checkability, and random-self-reducibility are known (cf. 14, 111]): All checkable sets are coherent; there is a coherent set that is not checkable; all sets in poly-RSR are coherent; there is a coherent set that is not in poly-RSR; there is a set in poly-RSR that is not checkable.
Question 24 Is there a checkable set that is not in poly-RSR? Good candidates may be the number-theoretic sets (see, e.g., 3]) in which the checkers randomize only part of the input instance and leave the rest xed.
Part of Yao's motivation in de ning coherence was to provide a way of proving that sets are not checkable. The best negative results that this approach has yielded so far are those in 14]: There is an incoherent (and hence uncheckable) set in DSPACE(n log n ); furthermore, if NEEEXPTIME 6 BPEEEXPTIME, then there is an incoherent (and hence uncheckable) set in NP. Because all sets in BPP are coherent, the result that there is an incoherent set \just about PSPACE" cannot be improved without separating BPP from PSPACE. On the other hand, all NP-complete sets (and indeed all sets that are complete for any level of the PH) are coherent (cf. 14]). Thus, if the answer to Question 20 is \no," the concepts of coherence and checkability are di erent even for sets in NP; the uncheckable, coherent sets in 14] are uncheckable because they are outside of NEXPTIME. (Fortnow, Rompel, and Sipser 53] show that all checkable sets are in NEXPTIME.)
Say that a set is nonuniformly coherent if it satis es exactly the conditions of Yao's de nition, except that the examiner is a circuit family instead of a Turing Machine. The incoherent sets in NP that are constructed in 14] are extremely sparse, and hence they are nonuniformly coherent. Diagonalization can be used to construct a nonuniformly incoherent set in DSPACE(n log n ), but the proof yields nothing about NP.
Question 25 Is there a nonuniformly incoherent set in NP? Question 26 Yao's de nition of coherence has proved very useful in deriving negative results on checkability and random-self-reducibility. Can it be used to derive results about other complexity-theoretic concepts?
Examples of random-self-reducible functions were part of the motivation for the de nition of one-oracle instance-hiding schemes (de ned in 2], where they are called \encryption schemes for functions"). There, it is shown that no NP-hard function has such a scheme, unless the PH collapses to the third level. More recently, multioracle instance-hiding schemes were introduced in 10]. We give an intuitive explanation of what they are here; a precise de nition appears in 10].
An m-oracle instance-hiding scheme for the function f is a synchronous protocol executed by a probabilistic, polynomial-time querier A and m all-powerful oracles B 1 , : : :, B m . The goal is for A to use the power of the B i 's to compute f(x), for some hard-to-compute function f, without revealing x to the oracles. In each round of the protocol, A can send a message to each B i and receive a response from each B i ; there is no bound on the amount of computation used by the oracles in each round, and in fact the responses may not be even be computable (hence the term \oracle"); the querier, of course, can only do a polynomial-time computation in each round. B i cannot communicate with B j during the protocol, for all pairs i 6 = j, nor does B i see the messages sent between A and B j . At the end of the protocol, A computes f(x), using x, its private coin tosses, and the oracles' responses. The requirement that the protocol be instance-hiding means that, for any x and x 0 such that jxj = jx 0 j, for all oracles B i , the distribution of messages exchanged by A and B i is identical. 4 Thus no B i learns anything about A's private input x except its length. An instance-hiding scheme is allowed to be adaptive, in that both queries and answers in any round may depend on the messages exchanged in previous rounds.
It is shown in 10] that every boolean function, even those that are non-r.e., has an (n ? c log n)-oracle instance-hiding scheme, for any constant c, where n is the length of A's input x. This general upper bound was improved to n=c log n in 11]. The multioracle instance-hiding schemes in 10, 11] do not use the full, adaptive power available to them. They have the following special form.
De nition 2 A function f : f0;1g ! f0;1g is (1; k)-locally-random-reducible (abbreviated (1; k)-lrr) to a function g : f0;1g ! f0;1g if there are polynomial-time computable functions , 1 , : : :, k and polynomially-bounded functions m(n) and w(n) such that (1) for all n, all x 2 f0;1g n , and all r 2 f0;1g m(n) , f(x) = (x; r; g( 1 (x; r)); : : :; g( k (x; r))); and (2) if r is chosen uniformly from f0;1g m(n) , then each i (x; r) is distributed uniformly over f0;1g w(n) .
Once again, k is a function of n and the i 's are dependent. Clearly, a locally random reduction can be thought of as a one-round instance-hiding scheme: Querier A chooses r, computes the random instances i (x; r), sends i (x; r) to oracle B i (for all i), receives the responses fg( i (x; r))g, and uses them to deduce f(x). Question 27 Is every boolean function (1; k)-lrr to some other function, where k(n) = o(n= log n)?
Question 28 The upper bound of n=c log n holds for all booleans functions, even those that , it is shown that NP-hard functions have no one-oracle instance-hiding schemes, with or without adaptiveness, unless the PH collapses. On the other hand, the multioracle instance-hiding schemes given in 10, 11] are non-adaptive. Is there any way to use adaptiveness? In particular, can it be used to reduce the number of oracles?
Zero-knowledge proof systems are two-player games in which the powerful player hides the answer from the weak player. Instance-hiding schemes are two-player games in which the weak player hides the question from the powerful player. It is natural to ask whether both of these objectives can be obtained in the same game.
Towards this end, Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld (see Section 2.3 below) have de ned private/adaptive checkers and Beaver, Feigenbaum, and Shoup 12] have de ned zero-knowledge, instance-hiding proof systems. It is shown in 12] that any function that has a multiprover interactive proof system also has one that is both zero-knowledge and instance-hiding. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a basic two-party protocol introduced by M. Rabin. It enables one user to transmit a secret with success probability 1/2, without knowing the result of the transmission. It is analogous to sending a letter that arrives with probability 1/2. Kilian 72] showed that OT is complete for the set of protocols for secure distributed circuit evaluation. In the absence of any kind of physical channel security, the only known mechanisms for achieving an O.T. are based it on mathematical (cryptographic) assumptions. This is the classical cryptographic context, and it is the context of this work. It is known that OT is possible if trapdoor function exists.
Recently, OT was proposed as a way to achieve non-interactive (or limited-interaction) procedures. This led us to ask what the round complexity of a (mathematically-based) OT protocol is. We show in this paper that OT is inherently interactive.
We also show the impossibility of implementing \perfect" OT (that is, perfect in an information-theoretic sense). We give a strong indication (in the sense of ) that OT will be hard to implement under the assumption that a one-way function exists. Finally, we investigate consequences of these results.
(A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.) Stuart Haber: Security Against Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
Since zero-knowledge proofs were proposed 61], they have seen several di erent uses in cryptography. In a number of extended abstracts published in conference proceedings, zero-knowledge proofs have been used in one or another way in order to specify a public-key cryptosystem that achieves one or another sort of security against chosen-ciphertext attack (for example, the speaker did this, along with his coauthors, at Crypto ' 85 54] ). None of these published claims included a precise de nition of the security achieved, let alone a proof (for example, ditto).
In this talk I would like to suggest a formal de nition for chosen-ciphertext security, hoping to elicit comment and criticism. Then I will show how I can use the properties of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (as formalized by Tompa-Woll 109] and Feige-Fiat- Shamir 51] ) in order to prove, while waving only one of my hands, that the interactive cryptosystem we proposed at Crypto '85 actually satis es the proposed de nition.
(Joint work with Z. Galil and M. Yung. A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.)
Lenore Cowen: On the Structure of Secret-Key-Exchange Protocols A secret key exchange protocol, which enables two parties to establish a common and secret key over public channels, is a fundamental primitive for private communication. We show here that any secret key exchange protocol has strong structural properties. Our results imply that one-way functions are necessary for secret key exchange. As a corollary we obtain that one-way functions are also necessary for oblivious transfer.
Our results also imply that the existence of a secret key exchange protocol implies the existence of strong bit commitment schemes, and that perfect secret key exchange (i.e., in the \information-theoretic sense") is impossible.
( We show that a completely connected network with private communication lines can secretly evaluate a circuit of arbitrary depth in a constant expected number of rounds. Our results are based on three new techniques for multiparty computations, including secretly computing multiplicative inverses over a eld, simulating polynomially-bounded fanin multiplicative (or AND) gates, and secretly computing compositions of polynomially many secret permutations. No method to evaluate unbounded fanin multiplicative (or AND) gates was previously known, though unbounded addition is trivial.
There is a concomitant increase in message size, but for any function in NC 1 the number of bits required is polynomial in n. For arbitrary circuits we exhibit a tradeo in time complexity and message complexity.
For 3t < n, our methods tolerate up to t faulty processors, with Byzantine faults and a dynamic adversary who coordinates the processors. In a high bandwidth network of powerful processors, the round complexity of a distributed protocol is a measure of the time necessary to carry out the computation. Reducing round complexity while retaining feasibility of local computation is therefore an important goal.
The cryptographic protocol of 59] requires (dn 2 ) communication rounds, where d is the depth of the circuit evaluating the function, and n is the number of players. A variant by Haber 66] makes due with (d) rounds. The dependency in these protocols on the depth of the circuit being evaluated is due to the fact that the protocols distributively evaluate the circuit gate-by-gate, working their way from the leaves to the root. As time progresses, the community shares the values on wires closer and closer to the root.
The noncryptographic protocols of 20, 35] share this gate-by-gate approach and require (d) rounds. In fact, it might seem reasonable to believe that the depth of the underlying circuit family lower bounds (up to a constant) the required number of communication rounds, both for the cryptographic and noncryptographic case. However, Bar-Ilan and Beaver 8] show how a log-depth circuit family can be evaluated noncryptographically in a constant expected number of rounds, retaining polynomial computation for each player. This allows arbitrary circuit families to be distributively evaluated in (d= log m) expected rounds, where m is the number of leaves.
The work contained here was motivated by 8], but reverts to the cryptographic setting. We show how an arbitrary circuit can be securely collaboratively evaluated using only a constant number of rounds of interaction. That is, the number of rounds is independent of both the complexity of the circuit being evaluated and the security parameter. The local computation to be performed by each player is polynomial in the size of the circuit and in the security parameter. To achieve this, we assume that a one-way function exists and that the majority of participants are honest. The scheme necessarily departs from the gate-by-gate approach to collaborative circuit evaluation.
(Joint work with D. Beaver and S. Micali. An extended abstract of these results appears in the Proceedings of the 22nd STOC 13] . For further discussion of the power of constantround secure protocols, see 11].) Donald Beaver: Privacy for General Two-Party Protocols
We examine the problem of computing functions in a distributed manner based on private inputs, revealing the value of a function without revealing any additional information about the inputs. A function f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is t-private if there is a protocol whereby n parties, each holding an input value, can compute f, and no subset of t or fewer parties gains any information other than what is computable from f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ).
The class of t-private boolean functions, for t dn=2e, was characterized by Chor and Kushilevitz 36] .
In this talk, we give a characterization of 1-private functions for two parties, without the restriction to the boolean case. We also examine a restricted form of private computation in the n-party case, and show that addition is the only privately computable function in that model.
We also present an open problem concerning the existence private n-party protocols for computing non-boolean functions of n > 2 variables.
(A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings. The same result was obtained independently by Kushilevitz 74] .)
Butler Lampson: User Authentication and Delegation in Distributed Systems
A basic primitive for secure distributed computing is the ability of a system A to delegate to another system B the authority to act on A's behalf. User authentication is a special case in which the user delegates to a machine. When B requests service from another machine C, B will present credentials that are supposed to demonstrate to C that B is making the request and that A has delegated to B. We would like to be sure that the credentials cannot be forged (i.e., the request must have come from B, and the delegation must have been made by A). Also, when B has nished acting on behalf of A it should be able to relinquish its right to do so in such a way that even if B is later compromised, it will not be able to regain the right.
Public key encryption can be used to implement delegation. B makes up a fresh \del-egation key pair," keeps the private key secret, and sends the public key to A. A signs a \delegation certi cate" that authorizes B to act on A's behalf (perhaps for limited purposes only), provided that B's requests are signed by the delegation key. B signs his requests with both its own key and the delegation key. To relinquish its authority, B just forgets the private delegation key. The only problem is that with RSA public key encryption, things are not as fast as we would like.
User authentication is not exactly the same, since the user cannot do public key encryption in his head. There are various ways of getting around this defect.
Matt Bishop: Enhancing Security in Electronic Mail
The security of electronic mail sent through the Internet may be summed up in three words: there is none. The Privacy Task Force has recently released a proposal designed to remedy this situation. The mechanism provides both authentication and privacy for electronic mail using a certi cate-based key management scheme.
To send such a message, it must rst be encrypted using a data encryption key (DEK), which is itself encrypted using an interchange key (IK). The DEKs are chosen on a permessage basis, whereas the IKs remain xed (unless changed by the party or parties involved) for a given sender and a given recipient. The DEKs may use either private or public key systems; the IKs use the RSA cryptosystem. Each user has a certi cate consisting of that user's public key, user identi cation information (such as organizational a liations), and the identity of the organization whose notary has signed the certi cate; this is encrypted using the notary's private key. To transmit a message, the sender obtains the certi cate of the recipient and the public key of the notary who signed the certi cate; the sender then obtains the recipient's public key from the certi cate, encrypts the DEK using the public key as the IK, and places that in a header in the message.
The key management system is hierarchical, involving certifying authorities who sign certi cates and may delegate authority to identify (potential) users by a liation to organizational notaries, so (for example) an employee of Dartmouth College would not need to convince the certifying authority itself that the stated a liation is in fact correct, but would be able to do so to an organizational notary of Dartmouth College who could in turn inform the certifying authority that the a liation is correct. Similarly, the certifying authority may cooperate with other certifying authorities to provide secure mail between users certi ed by di erent uthorities. A mechanism for revocation and for notifying users that speci c certi cates are no longer valid is also provided.
(A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.)
Gene Tsudik: Secure Control of Internetwork Tra c
In order to preserve autonomy in an increasingly open and heterogeneous internetwork environment, controls must be added to internetwork protocols at the expense of packet processing speed. Neither traditional network access control methods nor current routing protocols are suited for secure control of transit tra c on an internetwork. This talk explores the design and performance of a new generation of internetwork protocols that support secure control of transit tra c.
Jim Reeds: Building a Secure Network based on Power of Attorney
In a large-scale, multilevel, secure, distributed computer system you need to have a convenient way of handling a wide range of special privileges, rights and authorizations. These rights will not all originate from a central control computer. Some will be nonce rights, forgotten soon after granting. Some will originate with the owners of the computers, some with the operators, some with the users. Some will be passed from computer to computer, in possibly delegated or diluted form. Some will be derived from others. It will be possible to be confused. Given a substratum of trusted computers connected by a trusted network, how can we build up a distributed system for creating, negotiating, storing, transmitting and exercising rights?
A small project at Bell Labs is experimenting with some of these ideas. For example, we are trying to nd a minimal set of substratum (operating system and networking) services needed to extend the le access controls (and associated administration functions) found in a trusted multilevel secure computer system to a distributed network le system.
One assumption is that almost all sensitive security actions (such as changing a user's clearance level, creating a new security classi cation, declassi ng data, etc) will involve use of a \power of attorney" (or \delegation" or \proxy") protocol, whereby a server acts on behalf of one entity (user, say) by exercising a right recieved from another entity. We have identi ed two substratum services that seem to be crucial ingredients for a power of attorney-based distributed secure system: a method of establishing secure inter-process, cross-machine communications \pipes," and a notation for recording rights. Since standard versions of (say) the UNIX 6 operating system provide neither service, we have been forced to design our own.
Thursday, October 4, 1989 Michael Merritt: Open Problems
This talk is primarily concerned with research methodology in the overlap of distributed computing and cryptography. A paper based on it appears in these proceedings.
Mike Burrows: User Authentication with Smart-Cards
The authentication of users in distributed systems poses special problems because users lack the ability to encrypt and decrypt. In a popular approach, the user is forced to trust the node he wants to use; in a more satisfactory solution, a smart-card assists the user.
Authentication is relatively straightforward with a su ciently powerful smart-card. However, for economic reasons, authentication protocols that place weaker demands on the smart-cards should be considered. These protocols are subtler, as they rely on intricate trust relationships among the principals in the system. We discuss a range of smart-card authentication protocols, and make precise their assumptions and the guarantees they o er, using the Burrow-Abadi-Needham logic of authentication 31] where appropriate. Questions of belief are essential in analysing protocols for authentication in distributed computing systems. We describe a simple epistemic logic speci cally designed for this analysis. The formalism enables us to isolate and express di erences between protocols, and it draws attention to subtle features. For instance, it highlights some redundancies in both information and encryption, as well as undesirable assumptions sometimes required to achieve authentication.
In this talk we review the basics of the logic. We emphasize public-key reasoning, and, as an example, describe the CCITT X.509 authentication protocols and some aws the logic has helped uncover.
( So far, a lot of e ort has been devoted to the study of cryptographic systems. Unfortunately, if the cryptosystem is used in an incorrect protocol, security can be compromised even if the cryptosystem is perfect.
Assuming the underlying cryptographic system to be perfect, we present a modelization of the probabilistic knowledge of the participants in cryptographic protocols. This modelization is an extension of the \Hidden Automorphism Model" introduced by Merritt 86] . We use it to analyze and nd the possible weaknesses of a number of examples. Finally, we present an attempt to systematically derive the representation of the participants' knowledge from the protocol.
(Joint work with P. Wolper. A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.)
Doug Tygar: Protection Models in the Security Toolkit I will discuss issues of notation, implementation, and semantics of security policies. I will present examples from two real systems, the ITOSS system implemented at Harvard and the MIRO system implemented at CMU.
(For further discussion of ITOSS, refer to M. Rabin and Tygar 98].)
Jurjen Bos: Detecting Disrupters in the DC Untraceable Sending Network
Untraceable sending is a transmission system in which it is impossible to trace the sender of a message. David Chaum proposed an implementation of this mechanism in 34]. There he addresses the problem of disruption, where a malicious sender uses anonymity to disrupt the system without being caught.
Here we present a new implementation that uses a method from coding theory in a completely new way. The resulting solution is much more e cient than Chaum's original one. Experience with implementing the best known practical algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in prime elds shows that they are only slightly less e cient than the quadratic sieve is for factoring integers of the same size. Neither the sieving procedure nor the problem of solving a sparse system of linear equations over nite elds presents a serious di culty. What this implies is that to obtain reasonable security, implementations of the Di e-Hellman algorithm and its variants require the use of very large primes.
(Joint work with B. A. LaMacchia. More information about the work described in this talk can be found in 75, 76] .) Arjen Lenstra: Experimental work on factoring Last spring we have factored a 106-digit number using otherwise idle cycles of approximately 600 machines all over the U.S., Australia, Canada, Europe, and Japan. The machines on our \factoring-network" used electronic mail to exchange messages. There are more than 600 machines on the electronic mail networks. How safe is the RSA-challenge if we could use all idle cycles on all those machines worldwide?
(More information about the factoring network and the recent number-eld sieve factoring method can be found in 78, 79] .)
Matt Bishop: Preliminary Statistical Analysis of the UNIX password algorithm
Lately concern about the strength of the UNIX operating system's password encryption algorithm has lead to some proposals for altering it. The proposals are aimed at increasing the time required to test guesses of passwords to see if they are accurate.
However, a more fundamental question has not been explored: Is it possible to deduce information about a password from its encrypted form? Although based on the DES, for which statistical studies have been conducted, the UNIX password scheme alters that algorithm by perturbing a table. How does this a ect the cryptographic strength of the one-way function?
Some very preliminary results of a statistical analysis are presented. The methodology will be discussed, as will the results, and suggestions for future work will also be presented.
Peter Weinberger: Security in Distributed File Systems I will present a view of distributed systems that questions some of the views described above. Two of the underlying assumptions questioned will be the feasibility of managing a global naming scheme and the transitivity of a binary relation formalizing \A trusts B," where A and B are computer systems with both human users and privileged programs.
Alon Orlitsky: Feedback in discrete communication X and Y are random variables distributed according to some joint probability distribution p(x; y). Person P X knows X and Person P Y knows Y . They communicate in order for P Y to learn X. P X may or may not learn Y . How many bits must be transmitted (by both persons) in the worst case? C 1 (p) is the number of bits required when at most one message is allowed, necessarily from P X to P Y . C 2 (p) is the number of bits required when at most two messages are permitted: P Y transmits a message to P X , then P X responds with a message to P Y . C 1 (p) is the number of bits required when P X and P Y can communicate back and forth. Messages from P Y to P X are called feedback.
The maximal reduction in communication achievable via feedback is logarithmic: all probability distributions p have C 1 (p) log C 1 (p) while there are distributions for which equality holds. Therefore, C 1 (p) can be exponentially larger than C 1 (p). Yet C 2 (p) cannot. With just one feedback message the number of bits required is at most four times larger than the minimal: C 2 (p) 4C 1 (p). For some distributions, C 2 (p) 2C 1 (p) .
Surprisingly, for almost all sparse distributions, P Y (who has nothing to say at the beginning of the protocol) must transmit almost all the bits in order to achieve the minimal number: C 1 (p). The number of bits transmitted by P Y can be appreciably reduced only if P X transmits exponentially more than C 1 (p) bits.
Cynthia Dwork: The Secret Message Transmission Problem
In the Secret Message Transmission problem there are two synchronized nonfaulty processors, A and B, connected by some number n of wires. A has a secret message m drawn from a nite set Q of values. There are two parameters, (for secrecy) and (for resiliency). The problem is for A to convey m to B while satisfying:
Perfect Secrecy: For all sets S of at most of the n wires, no listening adversary A L , listening to all the wires of S, learns anything about m (secrecy must be informationtheoretic).
Perfect Resiliency: For all sets R of at most wires (possibly, but not necessarily, disjoint from S), B correctly learns m, regardless of the disrupting adversary A D controlling and coordinating the behavior of the wires in R. We obtain tight bounds on n, the required connectivity between A and B, for this problem, for both the 1-way case (information ows only from A to B) and the 2-way case (A and B \converse"), under the assumption that the coordination between the listening and disrupting adversaries is restricted. Speci cally, we show that the bounds on n decrease by even with just one extra round of communication; moreover, both algorithms have cost polynomial in and .
We also study how the lower bounds on n are a ected by the degree of coordination between A L and A D . Unlimited coordination yields an increase of for both the 1-way and 2-way cases, and these bounds are tight. Prior agreement, between the two adversaries, on a disrupting strategy, yields increases of ? 1 or wires, tight in the 1-way case and for 2-round 2-way algorithms (our 2-way algorithm for this model also requires only 2 rounds).
Our lower and upper bounds di er by exactly one wire for 2-way algorithms of 3 or more rounds. Finally, we discovered an interesting relationship between secret message transmission and Veri able Secret Sharing. The results for 1-way transmission imply that the lower bound of 3t + 1 processors needed for veri able secret sharing (obtained by Ben-Or, Goldwasser This talk describes an approach that I have recently initiated to ensure correctness of computation. The idea, which is distinct from veri cation or testing, is to design programs to check their work. The lack of such checks by programs is, in my view, an oversight. Scientists, engineers, and programmers are all taught to check their work. Programs can bene t equally well from the same sort of activity; they can detect their errors by checking their results. This talk rst de nes program result checkers and suggests how to construct checkers for a variety of interesting problems. It points out the importance of randomization in the design of checkers, and the close tie between checkers and probabilistic interactive proofs. The idea of checking leads one naturally to try and design programs that correct their errors. As an example of what is possible, I show how to convert a package of fast but faulty programs for matrix multiplication, inversion, and determinant into a package that works correctly and fast on all inputs without exception.
(Joint work with S. Kannan and R. Rubinfeld. For further discussion of the notions of checking, testing, and self-correcting that form the basis of this and the next two talks, see, e.g., 3, 14, 21, 22, 70, 111] .)
Ronitt Rubinfeld: Stronger Checkers and General Techniques for Numerical Problems
The theory of checking is a technique for designing a simple program, called the checker, which veri es that a possibly faulty program for a problem outputs the correct answer on given inputs. In the rst part of the talk, we present a general technique for designing e cient checkers for arithmetic problems. This technique gives very simple checkers which conceptually only rely on the ability to add, shift and compare. We show how to apply this technique to get e cient checkers for integer multiplication, integer division, integer mod, modular multiplication, modular exponentiation, polynomial multiplication, squaring and matrix multiplication.
In the second part of the talk, we discuss stronger notions of checking: We rst de ne what it means to check a self-modifying program, and then show how to construct such checkers for the aforementioned problems. We then alter the de nition of checking to allow the checking of private computations, i.e. ones in which the program calls made by the checker do not reveal the computation that is being checked. We show how to construct such private checkers for the aforementioned problems.
(Joint work with M. Blum and M. Luby. A paper based on the material in the second part of this talk appears in these proceedings.)
Sampath Kannan: Checkers in Group Theory
Group theory is an interesting area for developing program checkers for several reasons:
Computational group theorists often worry about the reliability of computer-produced results. The structure of group theoretic problems can be exploited in the design of e cient program checkers. The rich polynomial equivalence structure among group-theoretic problems allows for the design of checkers for several problems at once.
In the rst half of the talk, these and other general issues in checking group-theoretic computation are discussed. In the second half, we focus on the problem of group isomorphism. We provide an interactive proof for the nonisomorphism of groups given as permutation groups. This goes part way towards a checker for the problem.
(An extensive discussion of checkers for group-theoretic problems appears in 70]. The interactive proof system for group non-isomorphism appears is 5].)
Richard J. Lipton: New Directions in Testing
We present a new theory of randomly testable functions. This theory is distributionfree, i.e., it makes no assumptions about the distribution of values used at run time. It demonstrates that testing can prove that programs are correct.
Michael Fischer: Secret Bit Transmission Using a Random Deal of Cards
In the game of bridge, players use open bids to communicate information about their hands to their partners. It is to their advantage to use a bidding strategy that releases as little useful information as possible to the opponents.
We abstract from bridge to consider the following problem: Player A has a secret bit s (independent of her hand) which she wants to communicate to her partner, player B, but she doesn't want her opponents to gain any information at all about s. Players are dealt hands at random from a deck of size n, with player A receiving p cards, player B receiving q cards, and the remaining r = n ? p ? q cards going to the opponents. Players A and B then carry on a conversation in which they can make arbitrary statements, but everything they say is public and is heard by the opponents.
We present several protocols for A and B which solve this problem under various assumptions. The easiest assumes that A and B have access to random number generators. (Note that public key cryptography is not applicable here because we place no limit on the computational power of the opponents.) This protocol works whenever p; q 1 and p + q r + 2, so the partners together have more than half the cards in the deck. Rather surprisingly, it is su cient for the partners to receive any xed fraction of the cards (say 1/10) if the deck is su ciently large. We also establish a general condition on p, q, and r that implies that no protocol exists, and we discuss the e ects of requiring that the protocols for A and B be deterministic.
(Joint work with M. Paterson and C. Racko . A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.)
Rafail Ostrovsky: E cient Computation on Oblivious RAMs.
A machine is oblivious if the sequence in which it accesses memory locations is equivalent for any two programs with the same running time. For example, an oblivious Turing Machine is one for which the movement of the heads on the tapes is identical for each computation. (Thus, it is independent of the actual input.) What is the slowdown in the running time of any machine, if it is required to be oblivious?
In 1979, Pippenger and Fischer 96] showed how a two-tape Turing Machine can simulate, on-line, a one-tape Turing Machine, with a logarithmic slowdown in the running time. We show a similar result for the random-access memory (RAM) model of computation. In particular, we show how to do an on-line simulation of an arbitrary RAM program by a probabilistic RAM whose memory access pattern is independent of the program which is being executed, and only with a poly-logarithmic slowdown in the running time.
Our proof yields a technique of e ciently hiding (through randomization) the access pattern into any composite data-structure. We exhibit applications of our technique to secure distributed databases and to software protection, solving an open problem posed by Goldreich 56] .
What is the relative power of the standard RAM model of computation compared to a probabilistic Oblivious RAM (a RAM with a random oracle) model? We show that the two models of computation di er only by a polylog factor in their running time. That is, we show how to do an on-line simulation of an arbitrary RAM program by a probabilistic RAM whose memory access pattern is independent of the program which is being executed, and with only a poly-logarithmic slowdown in the running time. The proof of our result yields a novel technique of e ciently hiding (through randomization) the access pattern into any composite data-structure.
Our result can be strengthened in the practical world by using any one-way function to simulate a random oracle 57]. We stress, though, that cryptography is not needed in the proof of our main result. We now list some of the applications of our techchnique.
One of the application of our result deals with a distributed database in which no user can hold at one time more then a small part of the database, and in which a polynomialtime adversary can monitor all communication lines. Encryption hides the contents of the messages, but does not hide which communication lines are used. Thus, indirectly, some information about the database is revealed to an adversary. For example, an adversary can learn which part of the database is most useful (i.e., most frequently read and updated), and which part of the database is most useful to a particular user. How can users hide the access sequence without sending too many additional messages? Our technique yields a simple and e cient solution to this problem.
Another application concerns software protection, one of the most important issues in computer practice. A theoretical formulation of the problem for a generic one-processor, random-access machine (RAM) model of computation was given by Goldreich 56] . In this paper, we present a simple and an e cient software protection scheme for this model. In particular, we show how to protect any program at the cost of a poly-logarithmic slowdown in the running time of the protected program.
Software is very expensive to create and very easy to steal. \Software piracy" is a major concern (and a major loss of revenue) to all software-related companies. Software pirates borrow/rent software they need, copy it to their computer and use it without paying anything for it. The question of how one prevents a pirate from illegal copying of software is a question of \software protection". Let us examine various options which any software company has when considering how to protect its software. On one hand, it can sell a physically shielded computer with all the software installed, which self-destructs if ever opened. Clearly, such a \solution" eliminates the problem of software piracy at the price of forcing customer to purchase a new computer for each new task. We consider such a \solution" infeasible and contradictory to a general-purpose machine paradigm. One would want to sell just the software, which runs on any general-purpose computer, but which is impossible to copy. This, however, is unachievable: if one sells software which runs on any general-purpose computer, the software can always be duplicated. Thus, we always need some physically-shielded hardware to prevent the duplication. What is the minimal amount of protected hardware one needs? We require only a constant number of registers to be physically protected. That is, only a single chip with a xed number of registers is protected while the entire memory is open to the pirate, who can inspect it and alter it, in order to learn something about the protected program. Thus, we assume that a physically shielded chip is connected to a random access memory (RAM) to which the pirate has a complete read/write access.
The next question we turn to is the interpretation of \software protection". Let us consider the following hypothetical situation: suppose you are a software producer selling a protected program which took you an enormous e ort to write. Your competitor purchases your program, experiments with it widely and learns some partial information about your implementation. Intuitively, if the information he gained through experimentation with your protected program simpli es his task of writing a software package, then we consider the protection scheme to be insecure. Thus, the software protection must hide all the information about the implementation. Software protection is secure if, intuitively, whatever any poly-time adversary can do when having access to an (encrypted) program running on a protected chip, he can also do when having access to a \speci cation oracle" (such an oracle on any input \magically" gives the output and the running time). Essentially, the protected program must behave like a black box which, on any input, hums for a while and gives an output and such that no information except its I/O behavior and running time can be extracted. Thus, not only the values stored in the general-purpose memory must be hidden (using encryption) but also the sequence in which memory locations are accessed during program execution must be hidden. Notice that if this is not the case, the program \loop structure" is revealed to the adversary, even if all the memory locations are securely encrypted. Surely, the information about the \loop structure" does provide some information about the structure of the code. To prevent this, the memory access pattern should be independent of the program which is being executed.
Nothing comes without a price. What is the price one has to pay for protecting the software? The answer is \speed". The protected program will run slower then the unprotected one. What is the minimal slowdown we can achieve without sacri cing the security of the protection? Software protection overhead is de ned as the number of steps the protected program must make for each step of the source-code program. The key problem of e cient software protection is to be able to hide the access pattern e ciently. Goldreich shows how to achieve O((log m) c 2 p 2 log m log log m ) overhead for hiding the access pattern, where m is the total (RAM) memory size and c is some small constant. He conjectures that a poly-logarithmic (in m) overhead is impossible to achieve.
We show how to achieve a poly-logarithmic overhead of hiding the access pattern. Actually, our result is even stronger: we show how to achieve a poly-logarithmic overhead as a function of the program running time for hiding the access pattern, instead of polylogarithmic overhead of total RAM memory size, which could be much bigger then the program running time.
(An extended abstract of these results appears in Open problems concerning this speci c example of database encryption and its relationship to the more general software-protection question.
(Joint work with J. Feigenbaum and M. Liberman. A paper based on this talk appears in these proceedings.) Sha Goldwasser: Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Digital Signatures Using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, we provide a simple new paradigm for digital signing and message authentication secure against adaptive chosen-message attack. In contrast to previous work, our signatures are independent of previous signatures.
For digital signatures, we require that the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs be publicly veri able: they should be checkable by anyone rather than directed at a particular veri er. We accordingly show how to i mplement non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in a network so that anyone in the network can check correctness unilaterally, while the proof is zero-knowledge with respect to any su ciently small coalition.
(Joint work with M.
Bellare. An extended abstract of these results appears in the Proceedings of the 9th CRYPTO 15] .) Andrew C. Yao: On the Complexity of Inverting One-Way Functions I will address the relationship between secret-sharing schemes and monotone circuit size. I conjecture that a family of subsets has a computationally feasible secret sharing scheme (cfsss) i it has a polynomial-size monotone circuit for the membership problem. What can be proved is the existence of a cfsss implies a polynomial-size nonmonotone circuit for the membership problem, and if one-way function exists, then a monotone circuit for the membership problem implies a cfsss.
Rafail Ostrovsky: Comparison of Bit-Commitment and Oblivious Transfer Protocols when Players have Di erent Computing Power
We study the hardness of complexity-based implementations of bit-commitment and oblivious transfer protocols when players are of di erent computing power. We show that the hardness in the following three cases is equivalent:
Bit-commitment from a polynomially-bounded player to an in nitely-powerful player. Oblivious Transfer from a polynomialy-bounded to an in nitely-powerful player. Oblivious Transfer from an in nitely-powerful player to a polynomialy-bounded one.
That is, given an implementation of any one of these three protocols, we show how to construct an implementation of the other two, without any additional assumptions.
We start with an informal description of Bit-Commitment (BC) and Oblivious Transfer (OT) primitives:
BC may be thought of as a way for player S (the Sender) to commit a bit b to player R (the Receiver) in such a way that the bit may be revealed to R at a later point in time. Before b is revealed (but even after b has been committed), no information about b is revealed to R. When b is revealed, it is guaranteed to be the same as the value to which it was originally committed.
In OT, as de ned by M. Rabin 97] , Player S (the Sender) has an input bit b. After the protocol, player R (the Receiver) gets b with a probability of 1 2 . R must know whether or not he got the bit, while S must not know.
In 1-2-OT, as de ned by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel 50], Player S has two bits b 0 and b 1 and R has a selection bit i. After the transfer, R gets only b i , while S does not know the value of i.
Cr epeau and Kilian 39] de ned -1-2-OT. This is similar to 1-2-OT, but malicious S can guess R's selection bit i with probability the end of the protocol, 1 2 < 1. 1-2-string-OT is similar to 1-2-OT, but here S has two strings, instead of two bits. Yao 110] de ned Combined-OT. As a common input, S and R are given a poly-size circuit C( ; ). S has a private input x, and R has a private input y. After the protocol, R gets C(x; y), while S gets nothing.
The notions of OT , 1-2-OT , -1-2-OT, 1-2-string-OT and Combined-OT were all shown to be equivalent to each other 38, 28, 72, 39] . That is, given any one of these protocols, one can implement the other ones. Thus, by \OT" we can refer to any one of them. It was shown, that independent of the power of the players, OT =) BC 38] ; the existence of any one-way function =) BC from an in nitely-powerful (strong) player to a polynomially-bounded (weak) player 89].
In many cases, BC and OT protocols are needed in the asymmetric scenario. For example, in zero-knowledge proofs 61], the prover, who is in nitely-powerful, may wish to execute OT with a poly-bounded veri er 73]. In some cases, veri er needs to commit bits to the prover 29, 17] . What are the most general complexity assumptions necessary to implement BC and OT when players have di erent computing power? There are four cases: (1) (strong (2), an implementation is known using claw-free permutations and trapdoor permutations 27, 63] and for (3) using trapdoor permutations 59]. In this work, we show that the di culty of implementing any one of (2), (3) or (4) plies a function of a special form: given a transcript of the \bit-committal-conversation" (which may not even be sampleable), it can be \decommitted" as both a zero and a one. (Otherwise the strong player can guess which value is being committed.) On the other hand, the weak player who knows one of the decommitals, should not be able to compute the other decommital (otherwise he can change his decomittal.) Let the number of random bits used by the weak player during both committal and decomittal stage be bounded by l. WLOG, decomittal of zero/(one) is the set of all strings of length l which could be used consistently for committal/decomittal of zero/(one) by the weak player. The players agree on single hard-core bit of a single \decommital" string for both zero and one (utilizing 102, 58] ). Subsequently, the strong player sends his two input bits XOR the agreed upon hard bits to the weak player. This can be shown to yield -1-2-OT.
(The implication in the opposite direction is straightforward: the strong player selects two random strings and plays 1-2-string-OT with the weak player. The \selection-bit" of a weak player serves as his committal. This was rst observed by Brassard.) 2 (weak BC ?!strong) () (weak OT ?!strong): Since BC follows from OT, one direction is done. In the other direction, the weak player has two bits b 0 and b 1 and he wishes to execute 1-2-OT to the strong player. Since we assume (weak BC ?!strong), it follows that the strong player can do both OT and BC to the weak player. The main idea of the protocol is as follows: the strong player commits 2 pairs of bits. For each pair, one committed bit is denoted as \encoding of zero" and the other as \encoding of one". One pair contains identical bits, and the other pair contains di erent bits. Using Combined-OT the strong player convinces the weak player that this is indeed so, without revealing which is an identical pair of bits. Then, using 1-2-OT from strong to weak, the weak player selects \encoding of b 0 " from the rst pair, and \encoding of b 1 " from the second pair and sends back to the strong player the two (ordered) bits which he got from each pair. Note that for the pair in which bits are equivalent, the strong player learns nothing, while for the pair in which bits are di erent, the strong player gets the bit while the weak player does not know which bit b i the strong player got. and sends messages to the other participant. by the end of the protocol, each party prints a key. The protocol is successful if A and B print the same key. The eavesdropper sees only the messages (i.e., not the messages between participants and the box), but he too can ask questions of the box.
Merkle presented a protocol 84, 85] in a variant of the ITRF model in which a quadratic gap is achievable between the number of questions A and B ask of the box and the number of questions C asks of the box. This protocol is based on the observation that two random subsets of size n of a set of size n 2 , intersect with high probability. The intersection point is the common key. The subsets are encrypted with the black-box function; therefore A and B have to ask n questions each. C has to nd the intersection point, and since the black-box function is random, he has to ask n 2 2 questions on the average. In 84], Merkle asked whether an exponential gap is achievable. This question was answered in 7, 68]: For any key-agreement protocol, one can construct an eavesdropper C, who can (with high probability) compute the agreed upon key by investing computational e ort that is polynomially related to the e ort spent by A and B. By polynomially related we mean, that if A and B ask n questions, then C asks poly(n) questions.
The impossibility of an exponential gap is often interpreted as an indication that keyagreement is impossible in this model. However, in some cases it may be possible to choose a particular n for which the computational e ort spent by A and B is reasonable, while C's computational e ort is forbiddingly high (even though the gap is only quadratic).
Next, let us consider the case in which all participants are probabilistic polynomial machines and each question of the box costs one unit. In this case, Merkle's protocol still guarantees a quadratic gap. It is not known whether there exists a protocol achieving a larger, possible exponential gap. It was emphasized in 68], that even if an exponential gap is achievable, proving the existence of such a gap will be di cult in our current state of knowledge. The random function may be viewed as an \ideal" one-way function: for every image, each preimage is equally likely, and the only way to invert it is by exhaustive search. A natural question that arises is what gap can be achieved, when we exchange the random function with the weaker notion of a one-way function. The stronger assumption that trapdoor functions exist is su cient for achieving a superpolynomial gap (see 45] ). On the other hand, we do not know whether even a polynomial gap is possible under the sole assumption that one-way functions exist, because Merkle's proof does not work in this case. So, is the one-way function model su cient for an exponential, or at least, a polynomial gap?
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